- Author: Enrique Benjamin R. Fernando III, MA
- Year: 2022
- Type: Annual Philosophy Society Review Article
Citation:
Fernando, Enrique Benjamin III, (2022) “Illusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Fallacy of Causal Overdetermination.” Oxford Philosophy Society Annual Review44 (Nov.). pp. 70-75.
Abstract:
I challenge the increasingly popular view that mental states are both causally inert and non-existent. Firstly, I consider Frankish’s illusionism which claims that mental states are merely introspective illusions that do not exist. Secondly, I raise two objections against Frankish, the first being that public corroboration of introspective testimony suggests that mental states are veridical rather than illusory, and the second that Jackson’s epiphenomenalist ‘Mary’s Room’ example potentially discredits illusionism.
In Part Three, I consider Kim’s Argument From Causal Determination which I generalize as follows:
- Stimuli induce (C1) physical neural responses and (C2) mental experiences, which both cause (E1) behavioral reactions.
- Mental phenomena thus have effects on the physical world.
- But the physical world is a causally closed system insulated from the mental.
- Therefore, mental phenomena are physical phenomena.
- E1 appears causally overdetermined.
- To avoid causal overdetermination, one can accept that C1 causes C2 and E1 but deny C2 causes E1
- Therefore, C2 is causally inert.
I argue (6) is mistaken because individuals do not always react to the same stimuli identically. Most people recoil (E1) in pain (C2) if spanked (C1), but sadomasochists experience arousal compared to non-sadomasochists. The same C-fibers in their brains (C1) cause them to enter identical mental states (C2), but non-sadomasochists experience them as pain (E1), and sadomasochists as pleasure (E2). Because the difference cannot be explained in terms of physical events, it must arise from the quality of mental states. This is the fallacy of causal overdetermination: it equivocates between the causal influence that neural events exert on behavioral reactions and that which mental events do. To resist Kim’s argument, I distinguish between “triggering causes” like C1 which activate mental states that may otherwise not materialize, and “phenomenal causes” like C2 whose qualitative properties yield various reactions.
Key Words: