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University of the Philippines Diliman | College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
  • Author: Enrique Benjamin R. Fernando III, MA
  • Year: 2022
  • Type: Peer-Reviewed Journal Article

Citation: 

Fernando, Enrique Benjamin III. (2022) “Liberty, Equality, and the Wilt Chamberlain Argument.” Social Ethics Society Journal of Applied Philosophy. Special Issue. (Oct. 2022). pp. 32-54.

Abstract:

The objective of this paper is to respond to some recent developments in an oft-overlooked aspect of the Rawls-Nozick debate, specifically, Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument which implies that Rawls’ Liberty and Difference Principles are formally inconsistent. Political philosophers have tended to side with Rawls on this issue of late, and they share, in my interpretation, a very interesting change of strategy. Whereas Nozick’s critics used to raise primarily consequentialist objections to the argument—specifically, objections which purport to show the injustice of the Liberty Principle’s outcomes—recent scholarship has trended towards non-consequentialist objections instead. In particular, they share either of two assumptions concerning the concept of economic liberty in particular, which I shall refer to as the Exclusion and Pluralism Assumptions respectively. They assume that either (a) economic liberties such as the liberty to freely transfer property is not protected to the same extent as other liberties under the Liberty Principle or (b) economic liberty is just one value among others, including other kinds of liberty. They then use either or both of these assumptions to license the conclusion that the two principles are not contradictory, i.e. to prove that the redistribution of property in accordance with the Difference Principle does not violate the Liberty Principle as formulated by Rawls.

In this paper, I shall argue that this line of criticism is mistaken, and that Nozick’s argument does, in fact, expose deep tensions within Rawls’ theory. To this end, I will introduce a modest conception of what I call the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ structure of liberty. The former explains the relationship of the positive liberty-negative liberty distinction in relation to the Liberty Principle, while the latter explains the concept of what I call an ‘enabling’ liberty and its connection with other kinds of values and goods. I will use this conception to show that both the Exclusion and Pluralism Assumptions are mistaken, and that, as a result, the Wilt Chamberlain Argument is capable of withstanding this new line of objection.

Key Words:

 Liberty, Equality, Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice, Wilt Chamberlain Argument, Liberalism, Libertarianism

Link:

http://ses-journal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/SES-Journal-Article-2-Special-Issue-2-2022.pdf