A Cosmopolitan Perspective of the Right to Move: Thoughts on the Sustainability of Internal and External Migration
Karen Connie M. Abalos-Orendain. 9/23/2022. “A Cosmopolitan Perspective of the Right to Move: Thoughts on the Sustainability of Internal and External Migration.” International Workshop Series: Topic 1- Sustainable Development in Rural Areas. UEH, Vihn Long Campus, Vietnam: UEH Publishing House.
Beyond Language – Reassessing Deliberative Democracy Amid the Challenge of Immigration
Karen Connie Abalos Orendain. 12/14/2022. “Beyond Language – Reassessing Deliberative Democracy Amid the Challenge of Immigration .” THE 1ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE PHILOSOPHY AND LAW (IPL 2022) “Rethinking Life and Normative Order in a World of Conflicting Values: Transdisciplinary Perspectives from Asia.” UEH, Ho Chi Mihn, Vietnam: UEH Publishing House.
Illusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Fallacy of Causal Overdetermination
Citation:
Fernando, Enrique Benjamin III, (2022) “Illusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Fallacy of Causal Overdetermination.” Oxford Philosophy Society Annual Review44 (Nov.). pp. 70-75.
Abstract:
I challenge the increasingly popular view that mental states are both causally inert and non-existent. Firstly, I consider Frankish’s illusionism which claims that mental states are merely introspective illusions that do not exist. Secondly, I raise two objections against Frankish, the first being that public corroboration of introspective testimony suggests that mental states are veridical rather than illusory, and the second that Jackson’s epiphenomenalist ‘Mary’s Room’ example potentially discredits illusionism.
In Part Three, I consider Kim’s Argument From Causal Determination which I generalize as follows:
- Stimuli induce (C1) physical neural responses and (C2) mental experiences, which both cause (E1) behavioral reactions.
- Mental phenomena thus have effects on the physical world.
- But the physical world is a causally closed system insulated from the mental.
- Therefore, mental phenomena are physical phenomena.
- E1 appears causally overdetermined.
- To avoid causal overdetermination, one can accept that C1 causes C2 and E1 but deny C2 causes E1
- Therefore, C2 is causally inert.
I argue (6) is mistaken because individuals do not always react to the same stimuli identically. Most people recoil (E1) in pain (C2) if spanked (C1), but sadomasochists experience arousal compared to non-sadomasochists. The same C-fibers in their brains (C1) cause them to enter identical mental states (C2), but non-sadomasochists experience them as pain (E1), and sadomasochists as pleasure (E2). Because the difference cannot be explained in terms of physical events, it must arise from the quality of mental states. This is the fallacy of causal overdetermination: it equivocates between the causal influence that neural events exert on behavioral reactions and that which mental events do. To resist Kim’s argument, I distinguish between “triggering causes” like C1 which activate mental states that may otherwise not materialize, and “phenomenal causes” like C2 whose qualitative properties yield various reactions.
Key Words:
Semantic, Conceptual, and Interpretive Theories of Law
Citation:
Fernando, Enrique Benjamin III R. (2021) “Semantic, Conceptual, and Interpretive Theories of Law.” Suri 9:2. pp. 43-72.
Abstract:
A general jurisprudential theory explains the essential features of law. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison of three kinds of jurisprudential theories that have dominated legal philosophy in the last seventy years. First, there are semantic theories that seek to understand the nature of law by digging out shared linguistic criteria that designate the correct use of legal terms. Second, there are interpretive theories that take the perspective of the judge in constructing the most moral interpretation the law to determine what it “really” says on a case. And third, there are conceptual theories which explicate the logical presuppositions, implications, and concepts that underlie legal phenomena and reveal more than what is made obvious by language. This paper shall also defend Legal Positivism—the view that law has social foundations—against Ronald Dworkin’s objection known as the “semantic sting”, which claims thatpositivists are unable to account for the existence of deep controversy in legal practice by virtue of allegedly treating law as a trivial linguistic enterprise. It shall argue, alternatively, that deep controversy occurs because law is an “essentially contested concept”, which in turn occurs because law is a complex social institution.
Key Words:
jurisprudence, semantic sting, legal positivism, ordinary language philosophy, essentially contested concepts
Link:
https://suri.pap73.org/issue14/fernando_suri_october2021.pdf
Tarski and Modality
Citation:
De Guzman, S.N.S. “Tarski and Modality”. Suri 9:2 (2021): 1-22
Abstract:
Subscription to meta-language for self-referencing statements has been put forth by Tarski as solution to the Liar Paradox, suggestively indicative of the existence of higher order system through logic and language capable of substantiating truth. The paper aims to argue that the same methodology can be used to attribute truth values to propositions otherwise subsumed by many-valued logic. In many-valued logic, answers yield probabilities and multivalues versus definite truth values found in classical logic, yet this proves to be paradoxical as probabilities as a whole can be deemed to be either true or false. Wave function collapse yield stochastic states of affairs based on plugged eigenvalues, eliminating true from false states of affairs. Due to its aleatory nature, establishing truth values comes after decoherence, ensuing to probabilistic arguments such as the infamous Schrodinger’s cat-in-a-box experiment’s results, which is evaluated in terms of probability. Classical truth values “true” and “false” can thus be retained provided that the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle are relaxed. To argue that a state of affair (post-decoherence state) is true is to coordinate spacetime dimension along with indicative markers of possible world actualized via modalities; to state however that something is true in all possible world does not necessitate subscribing to quantum logic. Truth thus transcends multivalued truth as meta- language trumps object language, as modalities encompass quantum logic.
Key Words:
many-valued logic, quantum mechanics, Tarski, probabilities, meta-language, truth
Link:
https://suri.pap73.org/issue14/deguzman_suri_october2021.pdf
Exploring the Ethics of Space in Slum Research during COVID-19 through the Lens of Merleau-Ponty
Citation:
Lumagbas, Lilybeth C. (2021) “Exploring the Ethics of Space in Slum Research during COVID-19 through the Lens of Merleau-Ponty.” Asian Bioethics Review. Springer.
Abstract:
COVID-19 modifes a number of social behaviors and standards that we have been following. In slum research, the multifarious issues posed by COVID-19 are not limited to thincreased disadvantages of slum inhabitants, but also to the closure of slums as a physical space conducive to understanding the slum dwellers’ plight. Their voices are silenced at a time when their narratives are critical for developing policies and initiatives to address their predicament. In this regard, the article will examine Merleau-Ponty’s concept of space and then utilize it to create an ethics of space, which is crucial in establishing the viability of virtual space as a creative space that may be used in lieu of traditional slum research. Finally, I discuss the advantages of using virtual space as an alternate space in slum research and how the study might be expanded in the post-COVID era.
Key Words:
Merleau-Ponty · Ethics of space · Slum research · COVID-19
Link:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CaA6SB2T_Ucu22n7usxDB5GoPb3cuXCd/view
“God” The Name
Citation:
Fronda, Earl Stanley B. “‘God’ the Name.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 12(1): 91. (2020)
Abstract:
The word ‘God’ is typically thought to be a proper name, a name of a defined entity. From another position it appears to be a description that is fundamentally synonymous to ‘the first of all causes’, or ‘the font et origo of the structure of possibilities’, or ‘the provenience of being’, or ‘the generator of existence’. This lends credence to the view that ‘God’ is a truncated definite description. However, this article proposes that ‘God’ is a name given to whatever is that which is the first of all causes, the font et origo of the structure of possibilities, the provenience of being, the generator of existence. If so, then it is a descriptive name. Yet even among descriptive names ‘God’ is unique, for it is neither convertible to a proper name, nor to a definite description. ‘God’ is an inveterate descriptive name.
A fair allocation approach to the ethics of scarce resources in the context of a pandemic: The need to prioritize the worst-off in the Philippines
Citation: De Castro L, Lopez AA, Hamoy G, Alba KC, Gundayao JC. A fair allocation approach to the ethics of scarce resources in the context of a pandemic: The need to prioritize the worst-off in the Philippines. Dev World Bioeth. 2021 Dec;21(4):153-172. doi: 10.1111/dewb.12293. Epub 2020 Sep 23. PMID: 32965788; PMCID: PMC7537094.
Abstract
Using a fair allocation approach, this paper identifies and examines important con- cerns arising from the Philippines’ COVID-19 response while focusing on difficulties encountered by various sectors in gaining fair access to needed societal resources. The effectiveness of different response measures is anchored on addressing inequi- ties that have permeated Philippine society for a long time. Since most measures that are in place as part of the COVID-19 response are meant to be temporary, these are unable to resolve the inequities that have led to the magnitude of morbidity and mor- tality associated with the pandemic. These cannot improve the country’s readiness to deal with pandemics and other emergencies in the future.
Transition to a new normal recognizes the possibility that other infectious diseases could come and endanger our health security. Our pandemic experiences are proving that having an egalitarian society will serve the interests not only of disadvantaged sectors but also of everybody else, including the privileged. Response measures should thus take the opportunity to promote equity by giving importance to the con- cerns of the underprivileged and vulnerable while giving preference to initiatives that can be sustained beyond the period of the current pandemic.
Keywords
bioethics, COVID-19, fair allocation, ethics, equity, scarce resources, new normal
Link:
Law as Collaboration
Citation: Fernando, Enrique Benjamin III R. “Law as Collaboration.” Perspectives: UCD Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 9. (Winter 2021). pp. 250-277.
Abstract:
This article shall provide a critical exposition of two opposing views of law in the context of adjudication. The One-Way View holds that law is a one-way projection of authority by official unto citizen and emphasizes three “family resemblances” that tend to be shared by theories that espouse it: the formal character of its legal rules, its institutionality, and the conceptual significance of coercion. This article will offer three arguments against this view, which may be referred to as the Arguments from the Natures of Law, Language, and the Judicial Role.
The Two-Way View, on the other hand, holds that law is a collaboration. Law, far from being an autonomous and self- contained system, does not arise in a vacuum, unrelated to the society to which it owes its existence. Rather, law is a collective endeavor, the product of a collaborative effort between official and citizen that inevitably reflects the principles, conventions, and goals of the community. This article will argue that the Two- Way View not only better captures how judges actually decide cases, but that there are good reasons for even the citizen’s view of what is binding to be factored into adjudication and treated as law as well. It shall also be argued that because the collection of institutional materials cannot contain all that is relevant to the resolution of a case, the non-institutional and non-legal materials that contain information about beliefs, ideals, and other standards that aid in their interpretation inevitably come to form part of the law’s content.
Keywords
Law, Morality, Adjudication, Collaboration, Authority
Link:
Liberty, Equality, and the Wilt Chamberlain Argument
Citation:
Fernando, Enrique Benjamin III. (2022) “Liberty, Equality, and the Wilt Chamberlain Argument.” Social Ethics Society Journal of Applied Philosophy. Special Issue. (Oct. 2022). pp. 32-54.
Abstract:
The objective of this paper is to respond to some recent developments in an oft-overlooked aspect of the Rawls-Nozick debate, specifically, Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument which implies that Rawls’ Liberty and Difference Principles are formally inconsistent. Political philosophers have tended to side with Rawls on this issue of late, and they share, in my interpretation, a very interesting change of strategy. Whereas Nozick’s critics used to raise primarily consequentialist objections to the argument—specifically, objections which purport to show the injustice of the Liberty Principle’s outcomes—recent scholarship has trended towards non-consequentialist objections instead. In particular, they share either of two assumptions concerning the concept of economic liberty in particular, which I shall refer to as the Exclusion and Pluralism Assumptions respectively. They assume that either (a) economic liberties such as the liberty to freely transfer property is not protected to the same extent as other liberties under the Liberty Principle or (b) economic liberty is just one value among others, including other kinds of liberty. They then use either or both of these assumptions to license the conclusion that the two principles are not contradictory, i.e. to prove that the redistribution of property in accordance with the Difference Principle does not violate the Liberty Principle as formulated by Rawls.
In this paper, I shall argue that this line of criticism is mistaken, and that Nozick’s argument does, in fact, expose deep tensions within Rawls’ theory. To this end, I will introduce a modest conception of what I call the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ structure of liberty. The former explains the relationship of the positive liberty-negative liberty distinction in relation to the Liberty Principle, while the latter explains the concept of what I call an ‘enabling’ liberty and its connection with other kinds of values and goods. I will use this conception to show that both the Exclusion and Pluralism Assumptions are mistaken, and that, as a result, the Wilt Chamberlain Argument is capable of withstanding this new line of objection.
Key Words:
Liberty, Equality, Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice, Wilt Chamberlain Argument, Liberalism, Libertarianism
Link:
http://ses-journal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/SES-Journal-Article-2-Special-Issue-2-2022.pdf